Hailed by pro-Russian and anti-”globalist” agitators as a major shift of balance of power in the recent history, Russian and Chinese partnership is without doubt important partnership in modern world, but is this strategic partnership between two countries indeed a full fledged alliance? 

In order to answer this question, first we need to see the common interest of the two parties. Friendships and sweet telling is one thing – something Macron had full mouth with during recent Putin’s visit of France – and real common interest which actually form an alliance, is another thing. Of course, in economic sphere, there’s a lot of room for cooperation: China needs Russian gas, oil and food, and Russia need foreign money, especially in the circumstances where the West imposed sanctions on Russia. But is that alone enough to be called “alliance”? Well, lets see the strategic goals of the two. 

Firstly, when it comes to foreign policy, China’s focus is in the South Chinese Sea and on its southern border, something in which Russia has no interest or will to interfere, especially not with India and Vietnam, the major buyers of Russian weapons. Russia tried to push this “alliance” on the northern Chinese frontier, having little dispute with Japanese fighters, but in this area China would rather see silence. Another major Chinese goal is trade. Even though, Russia is very important trading partner of China, with a trade of about 100 billion dollars, this trade palling compared with the total Chinese trade of about 4.5 trillion dollars, of which the trade with US is about 700 billions of dollars, and with EU over 600 billions of dollars. This pretty much cripple Chinese willingness to interfere too much in Russian business, something for which Russia “earn” Western economic sanctions. So we can safely say in foreign affairs China has two main goals: regional policy with the focus on southern and southeastern frontier, and trade. In both goals, Russia has small role. 

Now, when it comes to Russia, lately Russian foreign policy has its focus in the Baltics, Ukraine and Syria, interference in which China has no interest to find, and especially not the will regarding those places are highly contested, something for which Russia “earn” sanctions from the West. Taking into account that China has enormous trade with the West, China has no will to endanger its trading position, one of its main goals, especially not these days when the trade war with US is ongoing. 

Economically, Russia needs Chinese money and products, especially in the case of the Western sanctions. This is opening another major areas for cooperation, which is making China ever more important to Russia, but, as Macron recently pointed out, Russia is a European country, and that does matter, not just in the areas of culture and history, but, most importantly, in geography: Russian economic might is concentrated in European Russia. Helsinki or Tallinn are a couple of hours of drive from Saint Petersburg; the border with China is mostly endless steppe and forest. This still make China very important country, regardless, but it’s not the replacement for Europe and thus, the focus of Russian foreign policy will stay on its western frontier, the place where China has no interest to align with Russian business, especially not considering China’s goal to increase good cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. Ironically, China would rather see less Russian meddling in Central and Eastern Europe, because this could potentially negatively influence Chinese relations with countries of Eastern and Central Europe. This is saying, Russia and China can form alliance only as a two pariahs, something which is probably the last thing China wants, and thus, ain’t going to happen. 

That being said, it’s not surprising that during the biggest international struggle after the Cold War, during the deepest crisis in Ukraine in 2014, when Russia needed support the most, China didn’t support Russia neither in UN Security Council, abstaining from voting. Now if China didn’t support Russia in its gravest moment on the international stage in the last 30 years, Sino-Russian “alliance” is compound of what? Compound pretty much of good will and sweet telling by pro-Russian agitators, but not necessarily of sweet telling by Putin and Xi, who would rather avoid sweet telling instead of straight forward action. But for that, there isn’t too much space for maneuvering, because in reality, the paths of the two parties leading in different directions, and their crucial interests – other than in some economic areas – are mostly splitting away.