There’s something quite problematic in Russian power projections which is outdated and already proved as wrong. The idea of spheres of interests and power is outdated and unsustainable. The powers which tried to implement this approach eventually failed after the First, the Second or the Cold war. The power which try to implement this approach, without having support from grassroot political groups, just overstretching its power and supply, which is unsustainable on the long term. 

When Russia deployed its forces in Syria in 2015, the war was already four years old, with Syria already changed as a country, and forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad collapsing in many areas. In its pretext of fighting war against ISIS, Russia started its areal campaign pummeling mainly Northern Syria, the area where Assad lost support from the grassroot population. Hailed military engagement around Palmyra was just a sideshow, while far more massive campaign against Syrian rebels in Northwestern Syria, in area known as Greater Idlib (area comprised of Idlib province, parts of Latakia, Northern Hama and Western Aleppo province, with Aleppo city as a focal point of the war still being divided on Eastern and Western parts), was less covered by media. 

One year of the campaign has passed with little progress, with rebels even gain ground in Northern Hama. With ISIS preoccupied fighting US-led coalition in Iraq and Syria, creating additional breathing space for Assad, Assad forces, reinforced by Iranian militias, Hezbollah and Russian special forces, could finally focus on Aleppo city, instead of fighting grinding battles in Northern Hama. 

After losing Aleppo city by the end of December 2016, rebels, with little international support and little options, decided to agree to all sort of ceasefires. After retaking Aleppo and with all tactical ceasefires, Assad forces could focus on declining ISIS, and after that, taking on isolated rebel areas across Syria, one by one. With tactical fake ceasefires and “reconciliation” agreements – the process which is still not completely over and with war still ongoing – after four years of its intervention, one thing is for certain: Russia has upper hands on Syria. 

But what this really means for Russia? Four years in war? What Russia really gain? With all controversies and speculations around wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US could say that they at least significantly degraded al-Qaeda, and even though both wars were unsustainable, US, putting all ethical questions and strategic mistakes aside, could afford it and absorb the blow. 

But what Russia really gain in Syria? Did wars in Afghanistan and Iraq made US stronger? No. So if US didn’t managed to extract anything from Afghanistan and Iraq – except possibly disrupted Afghanistan as an al-Qaeda’s “safe heaven” – why Russia could extract too much from Syria? Even further, Syria is not oil rich country like Iraq, with the biggest oil fields still under control of US backed, Kurdish-led, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). 

Russia has contracts with Assad for Syrian mines, but that’s still too little even to cover the military costs, and Russia can’t make too much of this kind of contracts because Assad desperately needs money. Syria is devastated country, with Assad being unable to neither sustain military costs. Even if Russia make Syria complete colony, it can’t extract enough just to maintain military costs and basic civil services. Without Iranian militias on the ground and Russian air power and special forces Assad would collapse militarily. Assad is for four years on lifeline coming from Russia and Iran, and this won’t change in the future, with Syria being devastated country with another boiling rebelion beneath, because, as I already mentioned, Russia lack support of grassroot movements outside of coastal area inhabited with Alawites and Orthodox Christians. 

And this is the crux of the problem: the projection of power, in order to become sustainable it needs two things: support from grassroot movements and stability. Russia has neither in Syria, like USSR didn’t had it in Eastern Europe. In order for sphere of influence, gained in “chess” board game of geopolitics, to work, Russia needs to provide lifeline for regimes and regions under the “sphere”, because this regions or countries lack grassroot movements in power or stability, or both: Ukraine under Yanukovych’s tenure, Donbass, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Syria, Venezuela, Crimea (economic wasteland for Russia). All those regions or countries lack stability or grassroot support for their governments. In long term, this is unsustainable and it will make Russia overstretching itself, making the collapse of the projection. Like the Warsaw Pact collapsed. 

US projection of power is different: US foreign policy is relaying on countries that have governments with grassroot support. And stability is always number one priority. So it’s not surprising – even though many taking it with cynicism – that US is usually insist on democratic process, not necessarily because they are enthusiasts, but because the support coming from grassroot movement is sustainable, and that kind of partners are reliable (something current US president don’t understand). Of course, many could argue wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are completely opposite. Maybe, but Iraq and Afghanistan had never been the key partners of US. US projection of power is relaying on allies like France, UK, Germany, Japan, Australia, and this alliance is arguably different than Soviet and Russian sphere of influence, having inside satellites and regimes without grassroot support. 

All that being said, the victory in Syria is not just pyrrhic, but potentially a trap, with endless years of engagement without any tangible result, engagement embroiled in strife with countries being in Syria, but having different projections of power, like regional powers, Turkey, Iran and Israel. 

In order for Russia to make something out of its foreign policy, it needs stable partners, stable and preferably rich, and Syria won’t become that in decades to come, requiring lifeline in order for seer survival.